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CLERK SUPREME COURT
UTAH
Mr. Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court
332 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re:

Case No. 900264
Supplemental Authority

Dear Mr. Butler:
This firm represents the Resolution Trust Corporation as
receiver for American Savings & Loan Association, plaintiff and
appellee, in Case No. 900264 which is pending before the Court. At
this time, the case has been briefed, but oral argument has not yet
been scheduled.
Pursuant to Rule 24 (j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, this letter is to advise the Court that additional
pertinent significant authority has come to our attention.
Specifically, on or about April 23, 1991, the Utah Supreme Court
entered its opinion in the case of Phillips v. Utah State Credit
Union, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (1991), a copy of which is attached.
The Court's discussion on pages 20 through 21, and particularly
footnote 9, is new Utah authority dispositive of the issue set
forth in Point I of American's brief, pages 7 through 10, which is
that the three-month limitations period for the filing of
deficiency actions is not applicable to actions to enforce the
separate obligation of a guarantor.

CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW

Mr, Geoffrey J, Butler
May 23, 1991
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Earle v. Warden of Utah State Prison
1 ^ Utah Ady, ^ p f t 17

tiorari. However, 1 express no opinion on
vvhether petitioner may present his claims on a
r*ew petition for habeas corpus in the district
c ourt. That question has not been briefed nor
presented to us for decision. I believe, therefore; that it would be premature for me to
express any opinion on that subject.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: (Concurring in the
ftesolO
I concur in the dismissal of the writ of certiorari. However, I cannot join in footnote
^ne's statement of the standard for determining whether a subsequent writ for extraordinary relief may be entertained by the trial
£Ourt. As stated in Fernandez v. Cook, 783
f .2d 547 (Utah 1989), a petitioner may raise
issues of ineffective assistance of counsel in a
nabeas corpus petition only upon a showing of
unusual circumstances." Id. at 549-50; see
tilso Dunn v. Coo*, 791 P.2d 873, 879 (Utah
1990) (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the
fesuit). In the present case, we are not in a
position to determine whether the requisite
unusual circumstances" exist, as Justice
fiowe notes.
Hak\ Chief Justice, concurs in the
concurring opinion of Justice Zimmerman.
f. Two petitions for habeas corpus have already
peen considered in this case by the trial court and
(her court of appeals. There appears- to be no legal
reason, however, why Earle should be denied the
opportunity to submit a third such petition. His
previous petitions were unsuccessful solely on procedural grounds. No court has yet considered the
substantive merit of his allegations.
Rule 65B(i)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the court cannot consider a petition for habeas corpus if it is apparent that the
legality or constitutionality of a petitioner's confinement has been adjudged in a prior habeas corpus
or other similar proceeding. The purposes of that
rule are to discourage successive applications based
upon the same grounds*. Burleigh v. Turner, 15 Utah
2d 118, 388 P.2d 412, 414 (1964), and to protect the
courts against vexatious and abusive behavior by
prisoners. Hurst v. Cook, IT) T.^d ltf», Itftb
(Utah 1989). Rule 65B(i)(2), however, only bars
successive proceedings involving identical issues. A
conviction or sentence that has not yet been fully
and fairly adjudicated on appeal or in a prior
habeas corpus proceeding should not be denied
reexamination because of a procedural default. See
Hurst, 111 P.2d at 1036. The record in this case
clearly demonstrates that the legality or constitutionality of Earle's habeas corpus petition has not
been considered. He is therefore not barred from
bringing another petition in the trial court.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Vail J. PHILLIPS,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
UTAH STATE CREDIT UNION,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 890300
FILED: April 23, 1991
Third District, Salt Lake County
Honorable Leonard H. Russon
ATTORNEYS:
Dale R. Kent, Salt Lake City, for appellant
Byron L. Stubbs, Salt Lake City, for appellee
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter:
HALL. ChieL Justice:
Defendant Utah State Credit Union
("USCU") appeals an order of the Third
Judicial District Court of the State of Utah
granting partial summary judgment to plaintiff
Vail J. Phillips and directing USCU to release
and reassign a note and mortgage held as
security, together with all proceeds due or to
become due thereon. USCU alsa appeals the
final judgment and order of the district court
entered after trial of the same matter.
On November 18, 1980, Phillips borrowed
$150,000 from USCU for the purpose of
purchasing real property located in Tooele
County, Utah. As security for the loan, Phillips gave USCU a note and a trust deed to the
property. As additional security for the loan,
Phillips assigned to USCU a note and mortgage which he owned as mortgagee with
Central Ranches, Inc., fka Deseret Springs,
Inc. ("Central Ranches"), as mortgagor. 1
Phillips failed to make payments on the note,
and on October 29, 1985, USCU served him
with a written declaration of default on the
note, which declaration was> - recorded on
November 21,1985.
In November 1985, Phillips received a check
from Guardian Title in the amount of $27,850
made payable jointly to Phillips and USCU
pursuant to the terms of the assignment of the
Central Ranches note and mortgage. Phillips
did not disclose to USCU that he had received
this check, but held it without negotiating it
for approximately one year.
Pursuant to the notice of default, a
trustee's sale was held on April 29, 1986, on
the Tooele County property. The property was
purchased by USCU at that sale for the sum
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of $90,000. The balance due on the note at the USCU, to satisfy the remaining debt of
time of the sale was $112,566.30, leaving $22,566.30.
$22,566.30 unpaid on Phillips' debt after the
The trial court rejected these arguments and
sale.
granted Phillips' motion for partial summary
In November of 1986, USCU received a judgment on April 29, 1987. In its order, the
letter from Guardian Title inquiring why the trial court required USCU to reassign the
1985 check received by Phillips had not been Central Ranches note and mortgage, together
negotiated. This was the first notice that with all proceeds due or to become due-under
USCU had concerning the existence of the that note, to Phillips. USCU's motion for
summary judgment was also denied at that
1985 check.
Phillips and USCU met later in November time. USCU filed a request for interlocutory
1986 to discuss the issuance of the 1985 check. review of the trial court's decision, which
USCU suggested that the check be placed in request was denied by this court on August 20,
1987.
escrow with USCU until it was determined
which party had a right to the proceeds from
On May 12, 1989, a bench trial was held in
the Central Ranches note and mortgage. Phi- the district court to determine the issue of
llips refused to follow this suggestion and damages. During this trial, the facts concerapparently tendered the check back to Guar- ning the issuance of the 1985 and 1986 checks
dian Title, who issued a new check payable to were made known to the trial court. USCU
Phillips and USCU in December 1986 as a renewed its counterclaim and requested
replacement for the 1985 check. Phillips also damages for conversion of the 1985 check for
received and held this check without informing $27,850. Final judgment was entered on June
USCU of its existence.
9, 1989, denying USCU's claim for conversion
On January 15, 1987, Phillips filed an and upholding the partial summary judgment
action in the district court based upon of April 29, 1987, which released the 1985 and
USCU's failure to bring an action seeking a 1986 checks to Phillips as proceeds of the
deficiency judgment upon the note pursuant to Central Ranches note and mortgage, but
Utah Code A n n . § 5 7 . 1 - 3 2 . 2 , P h i l l i p s ' denying damages to either party. USCU now
action sought a reassignment of the Central appeals the summary judgment granted to
Ranches note and mortgage and a release arid Phillips on April 29, 1987, and that portion of
reassignment of any proceeds due or to the June 9, 1989 final judgment denying its
become due under that note and mortgage. In claim for conversion and allowing the procits answer, USCU admitted that it had not eeds of the Central Ranches mortgage to
filed an action to seek a deficiency judgment remain the property of Phillips.
against Phillips for the remaining $22,566.30
Two issues are presented to this court on
and admitted that the three-month period appeal: First, did the trial court err in requiallowed under section 57-1-32 had expired. ring defendant to release the assigned Central
As its defense, USCU responded that it was Ranches note and mortgage, together with the
not required to reassign the Central Ranches proceeds due and to become due under that
note and mortgage notwithstanding the mortgage, to plaintiff? Second, did the trial
running of the three-month period for brin- court err in denying defendant's counterclaim
ging a deficiency action.
for conversion of the 1985 check because the
USCU counterclaimed against Phillips for action for conversion was not brought within
the- remaining $22,566.30 due on the note. three months of the nonjudicial sale of the
USCU claimed that it was not required to trust deed property?
reassign the Central Ranches note and mortThe trial court granted Phillips' motion for
gage nor to release or return the proceeds summary judgment based upon its reading of
from it but was entitled to retain the proceeds Utah Code Ann. §57-1-32. Because USCU
from that note and mortgage until the defici- had not brought a deficiency action against
ency of $22,566.30 was fully satisfied. Phillips Phillips within three months, the trial court
and USCU thereafter brought cross-motions ruled that USCU was no longer entitled to
for summary judgment based upon the plea- proceed in any way against Phillips or the
dings filed in the case.
security interest he had given to USCU. TheIn support of its motion for summary jud- refore, the trial court ruled that USCU was
gment and in response to Phillips' motion, not entitled to execute against the interest it
USCU argued that Utah's one action rule, held in the assigned note and mortgage and
Utah Code Ann. §78-37-1,3 precluded it ordered USCU to release that note and mortfrom seeking a deficiency judgment so long as gage to Phillips.
additional becunty remained available for
Because disposition of a case by summary
satisfaction of the debt. Therefore, USCU judgment denies the parties the benefit of a
argued that it should not be required to bring trial on the merits, we review the facts and
a deficiency action within three months in inferences in the light most favorable to the
violation of that statute and should be allowed party against whom the judgment was granted.4
to retain the Central Ranches note and mort- Where, as here, summary judgment is
gage, which had been validly assigned to granted as a matter of law based upon the
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pleadings rather than as a matter of fact, we this -additional security was not legal action,
reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions, but merely a retention of its validly assigned
giving them no particular deference, but i security interest, and* was not the type of
"action" against Phillips which is prohibited
review them for correctness.5
Section 57-1-32 sets. forth the procedures by section 57-1-32.* The effect of the trial
and standards for filing, a legal action to i court's ruling that required USCU to reassign
recover the balance remaining on a debtor's I the Central Ranches note and mortgage depobligation after a nonjudicial sale of property rived USCU of the ability to make use of the
securing the obligation. By implication, the act additional security it had bargained for and
also prohibits further legal action against the received in granting Phillips the initial loan.
debtor which is not.in compliance with its Therefore, the trial court erred in ordering
provisions.* Therefore, once the three-month that USCU was precluded from retaining the
period for filing a deficiency action has Central Ranches note and mortgage and in
passed, no further action may be had to seek a requiring USCU to release that note* and
mortgage to Phillips.
deficiency judgment against a debtor.7
In both Cox and Concepts, Inc., the action
We-therefore hold that where a creditor
contemplated by the creditor and denied by takes more than one item of security upon an
thettrial court through operation of section 57- obligation secured by a trust deed, the creditor
1-32 "was further legal action against the is not precluded from making use of that
debtor. In Cox, the creditor sought to bring additional security merely because the creditor
am action for a deficiency judgment against has not sought a deficiency judgment withm
theft debtor after the three^month period for three months'of a nonjudicial sale of one of
filing such actions had expired. Alternatively, the items covered by the trust deed property,
thr jcreditor sought damages for breach of nor is the creditor required to seek a deficicontract against the debtor, in Concepts, Inc., ency judgment under section 57-T-32'r4n
the creditor sought to void a prior trustee's order to maintain its right to the additional
sale of property because of a typographical security, so long as the security is applied
error in the trustee's notice of sale^ The cre- toward the debt owed on the original loan.
ditor in Concepts, Inc. had failed to bring an
Because USCU did not lose its right to the
action within three months of the original proceeds of the Central Ranches note>'and
trustee's sale and sought to avoid that sale mortgage by not bringing a deficiency action
and xe-seii the property, thereby giving itself under section 57-1-32, USCU's counters
an additional three months to bring a defici- laim for conversion of the proceeds from the
ency action against the debtor. The -Cox and Central Ranches note and mortgage should
Concepts, Inc. decisions prohibited deficiency also be considered. Because Phillips executed
actions filed against the debtors to proceed upon the $27,850 held by Guardian Title for
and prohibited other forms of legal action to the 1985 check and collected the 1986, and
proceed against the debtors because they had last, payment under the Central Ranches note,
been filed more than three months after the there are no remaining "proceeds" for USCU
trustee's sale of the trust properties.
to collect under that note and mortgage.
In this case,- USCU did not seek a deficiency Therefore, if USCU proved its claim for
judgment against Phillips. USCU had not filed conversion, it is entitled to judgment against
suit^and had not threatened any further legal Phillips for the amount remaining on hisr loan
proceedings against Phillips. It had taken obligation plus any other damages provable-by
additional collateral beyond the property sold US<pU which are the result of the conversion.
At trial, Phillips contended that USCU's
under Phillips' trust deed. USCU made a
conscious decision to collect its remaining debt conversion claim is one that would be preclfrom this additional collateral, the proceeds of uded under the three-month limitation in
the note and mortgage which had already been section 57-1-32. The trial court agreed with
assigned by the debtor. USCU contemplated Phillips' characterization of the statute and
that any further legal action taken to collect held that USCU's claim for conversion was
the remainder of Phillips' debt would be precluded because it was not brought within
against a third party, Central Ranches, not the three-month limitation period. Phillips'
against Phillips, the debtor. Therefore, this argument mischaracterizes the nature of
case differs from Cox and Concepts because USCU's conversion claim and the scope of the
USCU did not seek legal action against Phil- prohibition on further suits against a debtor in
lips beyond the three-month period required section 57-1-32.
in section 57-1-32.
USCU's claim for conversion arises from a
Had USCU sought a deficiency judgment different factual situation than its right to sell
against Phillips, the trial court would have or foreclose the property under the trust deed.
been correct in dismissing USCU's claim for Phillips' liability, if any, for conversion is
that judgment. In this case, however, USCU founded upon his acts in holding the 1985
did not seek a deficiency judgment against check issued from Guardian Title without
Phillips, but merely sought to retain its addi- informing USCU of its existence or determitional security. USCU's retention and use of ning with USCU whose property the 1985
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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check was. Separate acts or obligations-of a
debtor are still actionable within normal limitations periods even after the three-month
limitation found in section 57-1-32 has run.9
Therefore, a claim for conversion of the
1985 check from Guardian Title may still be
maintained against Phillips although the threemonth period has run. If USCU can establish
its .claim, then it is entitled to such damages as
it can prove were caused by Phillips' conversion of the check.
"
'
*"
In Alfred v. Hihkleyyl9this court set forth
the standards for a conversion of personal
property:
A conversion is an act of wilful
interference with a chattel, done
without lawful justification by
which the person entitled thereto is
deprived of its use and possession.
The measure of damages of conversion is the full value of the property. It requires such a serious interference with the owner's right
that the person interfering therewith
may reasonably be required to buy
the goods. Although conversion
results only from intentional
conduct it does not however require
a conscious wrongdoing, but only
an intent to exercise dominion or
control over the goods inconsistent
with the owner's right.11
The trial court made the following findings
of fact concerning Phillips' conduct in holding
the check from Guardian Title. These findings
of fact were not contested by Phillips at the
trial court level, nor are they contested in
Phillips' brief to this court. On October 29,
1985, USCU served Phillips with a notice of
default on the trust deed given in exchange for
the loan on the Tooele County property. In
November 1985, Phillips received a check
from Guardian Title Company made out to
him and to USCU in the amount of $27,850.
This check was issued in conformity with the
terms of the assignment of the Central
Ranches note and mortgage, Phillips failed to
disclose his receipt of the check during the
entire default period under the deed of trust
and also kept a subsequent check reissued in
December 1986 as a replacement for the 1985
check. USCU also contends that Phillips did
these acts with knowledge that the proceeds of
the Central Ranches note and mortgage were
security for the loan given by USCU and that
he was in default on that loan. These contentions are supported by the record and by
Phillips' allegations in his complaint concerning the additional security.
The acts of Phillips described above, combined with the effect of our decision that the
proceeds of the Central Ranches note and
mortgage were rightfully the property of
USCU, constitute conversion of USCU's
wrrm A WW

ite Credit Union
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check and its right to proceeds from the
Central Ranches note and mortgage. Therefore, USCU is entitled to damages for that
conversion in the amount of its property
converted by Phillips. The case is hereby reversed and remanded to the trial court for a
determination of what, if any, damages should
appropriately be awarded to USCU for Phil*
lips' conversion of the 1985 proceeds- of the
Central Ranches note and mortgage and for
further proceedings consistent wi£h:>thrs
opinion.
WE CONCUR:
Richard C. Howe, Associate Chie£ Justice
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice
Christine M. Durham, Justice
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice
1. This second note and mortgage related to different property than that for which Phillips sought the
loan from USCU and shall be hereafter referred to
as the "Central Ranches note and mortgage."
2. Utah Code Ann. §57-1-32 states in relevant
part:
At any time within three months after
any sale of property under a trust deed,
as hereinabove provided, an action may
be commenced to recover the balance
due.upon the obligation for which, the
trust deed was given as security, and, in
such action the complaint shall set forth
the entire amount of the indebtedness
which was secured by such trust deed,
the amount for which such prorjertyjwas
soidr and the fair market value thereof
at the date of sale.
3. Utah Code Ann. §78-37-1 states:
There- can be one action for the* recovery of any debt or the enforcement of
any right secured solely by mortgage
upon real estate which action must be in
accordance with the provisions of this
chapter. Judgment shall be given adjudging the amount due, with costs and
disbursements, and the sale of mortgaged property, or some part thereof, fo
satisfy said amount and accruing costs,
and directing the sheriff to proceed and
sell the same according to the provisions
of law relating to sales on execution,
and a special execution or order of sale
shall be issued for that purpose.
4. Concepts, Inc. v. First Security Realty Servs., 743
P.2d 1158, 1159 (Utah 1987); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis
Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987).
5. See Creer v. Valley Bank & Trust Co., 770 P.2d
113, 114 (Utah 1989); Concepts, Inc., 743 P.2d at
1159; Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady Sys.,
Inc., 731 P.2d 475, passim (Utah 1986).
6. See Concepts, Inc., 743 P.2d at 1161; Cox v.
Green, 696P.2d 1207, 1208 (Utah 1985).
7. Concepts, 743 P.2d at 1161; Cox, 696 P.2d at
1208.
8. Cases in other jurisdictions have held that the
retention ot additional security for a loan is not a
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prohibited " action", against the debtor after a nonjudicial sale of the debtor's property. These cases
allow a creditor to continue to pursue additional
security pledged by the debtor despite antideftciency
statute prohibitions on further action against the
debtor. In re Forester, 529 F.2d 310, 316 (9th Cir.
1976); Hull v Alaska Fed. Sav. & Eoan Ass'n of
Juneau, 653 P.2d 122, 125 (Alaska 1983); Redingkr
Vr imperial Sav. & Loan Ass'nvf the North, 47
Cat. ApfK.M4^ 50, 120 CaL RptK 575 0975);
FmetUand v. Greco. 45 Cal. 2d 462, 289 P.2d 463.
46&* (1955)/ These cases are based upon statutes
which allow no deficiency judgment against a debtor
after a nonjudicial sale.
*f43ee; e.g., Bank of Am. Nad Trust A Sav. Ass'n
v. Hunter, 8 Cal. 2d 592, 67 F.2dT99, 102 (1937)
(proviso requiring action for balance due to be
brought within three months after sale was intended
to prescribe time" within which deficiency action
must commence and has no application n? action
based upon independent obligation of guarantor);
Willys of Mann Co. v. Pierce, 140 Cal.'App. 2d
226/296 P.2d 25, 27 (1956) (unlawful detainer
action was not barred by statute); Afeyer v. Thdmas,
18 Cal. App. 2d 299, 63 P.2d 1176, 1178 (1936)
(action for conversion of the note rather than for
personal judgment on the note allowed); Valley
Bank v. Larson, 104 Idaho 772, 663 P.2d 653, 665
(1983) (anudefkiency statute inapplicable to independent obligation of guarantor); Nosker v. Trinity
Land Co., 107'N M. 333, 757 P.2d 803, 807 (Ct.
App.-1988) (lessee's action for conversion of equipment outside subject matter of foreclosure action
and thus not barred by res judicata).
10.8 Utah 2d 73, 328 P.2d 726 (1958).
11.328P.2dat728.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Sylvia DWIGGINS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v,
MORGAN JEWELERS,
Defendant and Appellee.
No. 890084
FILED: April 30, 1991
Third District, Salt Lake County
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson
ATTORNEYS:
Ronald E. Dalby, Matthew J. Storey, Salt
Lake City, for appellant
John L. Black, Lewis B. Quigley, Salt Lake
City, for appellee
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
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DURHAM, Justice:
Plaintiff Sylvia Dwiggins appeals the "trial
court's grant of summary judgment in favor
of defendant Morgan Jewelers. Dwiggins
argues that trie lower court erred in determining that Morgan Jewelers did not ^breach a
duty o f care or proximately cause Dwiggins1
injuries as a matter of law. We~affhmTThe
facts as alleged are insufficient to give rise to a
duty on the part of Morgan Jewelers.
b '
Dwiggins was _ shopping in the Morgan
Jewelers store located in a strip mall at 2774
West 3500 South in West Valley City when it
was robbed on December 10, 1986. During the
course of the robbery, one of the -robbers
struck Dwiggins on the head with a crowbar.
This Morgan Jewelers store had previously
been robbed in December of 1981: The-store
had no armed guard, an all-female staff at
the time of the robbery, and a dummy camera
that did not record or photograph. It also had
two stationary and twa or three mobile emergency buttons ta notify the Peak-Alarm
Company, which would then notify "the police.
According to rule 56 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, a motion for" summary judgment is* appropriate''only- when ncr genuine
issue of material fact exists and : the° moving
party is entitled to judgment as a "matter of
law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); see a/sd IHamblin
v. City of Clearfield, 795 P.2d I B S / 1 1 3 5
(Utah 1990). In determining whether the lower
court correctly found that there o w a s - n o
genuine issue of material fact, we View* the
facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in
the light most favorable to the losing party. Id.
-jOrdinarily, the question of negligence is a
question of fact for the jury. Hunt v. Hurst,
785 P.2d 414, 415 (Utah 1990), Thus,
summary judgment is appropriate in negligence cases only m the clearest instances. Id. at
415. Bare allegations of negligence unsupported by facts, however, arc insufficient to
withstand a motion for summary judgment. Id.
In Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d
240 (Utah 1985), we held that an (innkeeper
owes its guests a duty of ordinary care to see
that the premises assigned to them are reasonably safe for their use and occupancy. Id. at
243. We noted that the security required is
"commensurate with the facts and circumstances that are or should be apparent to the
ordinary prudent person." Id. The degree of
care will "vary according to the particular
circumstances and location of the hotel" and
includes protecting guests from the criminal
acts of third parties. Id. In Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 415 & n.2 (Utah
1986), we noted that the law imposes upon
one party an affirmative duty to look after the
safety of another only when certain special

